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According to analysts, the French scholar messages by Virginie Raisson, Director of Laboratory Research and analysis of political cartography (LEPAC) posted on 20/03/1996 Monde Diplomatique still calculates the problem.
Named a captain of a whaling ship the nineteenth century, the Spratlys, including many small islands and coral reefs located between the East Sea, the coast of China to 1500 km, 400 km coastline and coastal Vietnam Philippine Sea about 300 km or Malaysia. This is not exactly an area geographically, but a space in which today shows the correlation between these forces in Southeast Asia and East Asia (1).
On 2/25/1992, Congress passed a law China Sea China Sea put the majority under its sovereignty. Thus, self-possession Beijing a strategic regional significance on three aspects: a resource important oil and gas, located on the major international sea lanes, and there were six claims, all or part set (Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines and Taiwan).
Unilateral decisions that increase the rumors of conflict. Under the new law, now Chinese territory will include the Senkaku Islands (known as China's Diaoyu Islands), Paracels - Hoang Sa (the Chinese called the Western Sa) and Spratly - Truong Sa (known as the South China Sa). Since the Republic of China made their sovereignty to the territorial waters (12 nautical miles) and adjacent areas (12 miles) so that sovereignty will cover the majority of the South China Sea and resources there.
Legally, claims are still not clear. To legitimize the claims in the East Sea or in the Yellow Sea, China based on the continental shelf area of his. But for the South China Sea, they cited "historical reasons", but they did not speak clearly - they can not invoke the presence from the past and continue on the island first. The value of legal terms used to call the sea claim area (such as internal waters, territorial sea, the islands waters) is not clear.
Also, geographically, China's claims seem to have vague ideas: the dots shown by new sea border may indicate that a range can be sacred. In fact, the claims include the extraction and installation of equipment by Indonesia, Malaysia or the Philippines under control. Without a specific solution to the division of waters in the East Sea, the international rule of law will say to countries on the rights of an exclusive economic zone. Thus the possession of Beijing has unilaterally less legitimate and credible.
Therefore the following hypothesis: by extending their sovereignty so, China can not claim a territory defined by the standard material, shaped and legal objectivity, is a political space and economy are determined by other parameters. But what parameters? The answer lies first in the islands geographical location, but the two islands with almost a quarter of global trade is transported through. And so China will be able to carry out not only to control the sea but it is the dense network of air routes in the area.
The second parameter of the island land long: the Chinese, it can have the oil and gas reserves by 205 billion barrels of oil equivalent (BEF), but according to oil company exploration in the block area oil and gas a lot less. Apart from the potential field, additional tanks are produced around the islands: the Nam Con Son basin, Dragon and Dai Hung offshore Vietnam. North Natuna in Indonesia, and Camago Nalampaya Northern Palawan Island, Jintan, Serai and Sederi offshore Sarawak and Sabah basins in North West (3).
Thus, in total, China demanded to put his hand up the majority of the oil tank in the East Sea. Not only that, the war has been simmering between Vietnam and China over oil and gas companies involved.
May 1992, China for U.S. oil company Crestone special exploration concession 25 155 km2 in western Spratlys Ho Chi Minh City is about 300 km, next to special concessions Vietnam's Dai Hung. Government at that Hanoi had protested vehemently against the Hanoi considered that a violation of their economic sovereignty (4). China's answer completely clear: in July 1992, landed as they did in 1988 - a number of troops on a reef islands of the archipelago, setting a milestone border and assured company U.S. support of military force. Vietnam responded on May 4 / 1994 by special assignment for a U.S. oil company Mobil of the Dragon mine right next to mine exploitation Crestone.
Energy situation of both Vietnam and China to enlighten the real extent of such conflict. For Hanoi, the mining and petroleum exploration in the center of economic reconstruction. With 12% of foreign investment since 1988, and nearly one fourth of export, oil is a main source of income. It provides inexpensive energy necessary for the chemical industry (steel mills, fertilizer, petrochemical complex and power plants). According to recent polls, the continental shelf of Vietnam that most claims by China, which contains oil reserves estimated at 3 to 5 billion barrels and approximately 300 billion cubic meters of gas.
In China too, the energy resources are developed industrial conditions. The mines are exploited on the ground has dried up oil prices low and not conducive to new operators in the region, foreign investors now prefer drilling in areas more profitable. Moreover, the infrastructure of China on the exploitation and transportation still not enough. Located in the northeast and extreme west of the country, these places are in remote mining areas of energy consumption: the special economic zones are concentrated in the South China pay a lot expensive energy carried by the pipe oil. With the increase limited to 2% per year, oil production no longer meets the needs that the annual economic growth of 10% from 10 years to create. That explains why the need for Beijing to exploit new oil in the Spratlys.
A strategy to fill gaps
Besides Vietnam, China's attempt to seize the oil last in the East Sea may also lead to China's opposition to all coastal waters. For example, China claims covering the Natuna Islands of Indonesia, and especially the world's largest mine: is estimated at 137,000 billion cubic meters, which is the subject in January 1995, declaration of an agreement 35 billion dollar falls between the state oil company Pertamina and Exxon Company USA. But the commitment of a new U.S. company in the region do not fully reassure people is to ask Indonesia to clarify the legal Jakarta to Beijing yet tháng 7 / 1994 has not been answered.
Verbal threats of Beijing will use force to protect its sovereignty to increase the insecurities. Not the People's Liberation Army held a lot of the maneuvers from the start of the decade, it is also increasingly more intervention in the South China Sea. Since the clashes in 1974 in the Paracel Islands, the islands are higher than in the north, in which a Chinese warship has sunk a warship in Vietnam - to the impact of China - a new Vietnam in 1994, the not counting all the events, especially during the Beijing forces set milestones sovereignty.
That way, Chinese military occupation by eight smaller islands of the archipelago. They are not the only country: Vietnam occupies 25 islands, eight islands the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan 3 1. But, although the installation of permanent structures mainly to strengthen the position of the respective countries, other countries legally, the opposition they conflict with each other from now through the framework of a competition accept the simple resources in the region. Economic framework of the debate has been overtaken by the national ambitions through speeches Republic of the Philippines, Vietnam and especially China.
In contrast, although the increase was losing all kinds of things, the subjects more relevant, and military tensions growing, threatening to destabilize the region, finding a solution overall progress has not. The delay is of concern in part because, until 1994, lacks an appropriate mechanism to address security issues in Asia. The end of the Cold War led to the commitment to withdraw from the region, as the Russians pulled out of Cam Ranh base in Vietnam and the U.S. pulled out of the Philippines' Subic base.
Regional Forum on security established in 1994 by ASEAN can not bridging the gap strategy. Members of this forum as well as differences in their interests seems to have been a serious obstacle. Must also identify a location for those countries not members of ASEAN (5) in the adoption of security measures not only related to Asians. Without forgetting the big questions about how the tri.Lam ensures a real idea of China or Korea to discuss with the countries and territories outside the file record stands as Taiwan or Korea Korea and South Korea?
Whether China will participate effectively in a forum they are expected to be established to control them? Will we have built an air of confidence with which a member of ASEAN as the main threat to regional security, especially when it talks about the stress that China is considered the main character?
Can not resolve the conflict, the ASEAN countries have chosen diplomacy to prevent the first goal is through confidence measures. I am not entirely surprised to see the agenda of the forum most recently the winner 7 / 1995 does not include Spratlys conflict issues and problems of military trials of China's offshore territories Radio Loan, that only the French nuclear testing or the political situation in Myanmar (non-member countries). But the issue of sovereignty in the East Sea was the subject of much discussion in the corridors, all countries present interest in the Spratlys issue.
The conflict pushed the U.S. into the conflict scary. One face of budgetary pressures, "the definition of non-interference" of the Republic and the Congress have established guidelines on the traditional military. On the other hand, the presence in many regions of the petroleum companies are more powerful pressure group in support of Washington, the uncertainties of sea transport, determined to curb the ambitions of China and the requirements of countries in the region forced them to engage in debate.
In terms of the American official against the use of force or threatening to make demands of any country. If they refuse to show attitudes about the legitimacy of the claim the government has invoked international law to published reports of threats to freedom on the sea in the Spratlys. But the long-expected Gocdo between the need to make the long peace in the region in which the expressed determination for China's ambitions and the need to maintain dialogue with Beijing because of their common strategies, such as entering the Chinese market or limiting the supply of nuclear technology to Pakistan or Iran.
Since we can not definitively among many such urgency, Washington played a role in all performances. The economic pressures and the handling of sensitive issues in Beijing for Taiwan is coordinated with other manifestations of the ability to transfer F16 fighters to the Philippines from May 1995, sending navy commandos units to Puerto Princesa to train Philippine soldiers; 7 fleet maneuvers along with Japan and South Korea off the coast of China, also have projects with the same type as on Thailand and Singaporean.
To the Japanese, they had abandoned in 1951 on all your rights to the island archipelago that they had occupied since 1939 (6). But nearly 70% of oil supply to them through the South China Sea. As Americans, they want to protect the interests of their oil company. The decision whether or not the U.S. decision to apply the Law of the Sea in 1992, has a significance for Sankaku islands of Japan. In Tokyo confidential is required. It supports the search for a peaceful solution but no statement is the basis of the different claims.
However, the Japanese have available the powerful economic lever for the key, especially for Beijing. As a leading investment institution in China, Japan, for China is guaranteed to attract private capital, the Japanese will stop lending so much can be harmful to the search for Beijing of foreign capital. In addition, although Japan has no military means of deploying their troops in the region, they are equipped with sophisticated equipment and well trained in the marine environment.
In the meantime, the goal is not to Tokyo to Beijing takes long, but left again want to ensure their interests on a very promising market. Based on the experience of the Straits of Malacca in the 1960s, some people even rely on the integrity of the Japanese mediation to resolve the conflict of sovereignty in the East Sea.
The conciliation mediation of Indonesia.
Over five years, Indonesia in him that people already have most of the intermediary efforts of reconciliation. As there are no claims for any of the islands of the archipelago, Jakarta intervened reconciliation with the organization of annual meetings to discuss the measures "to avoid a potential conflict at Sea." But they take the initiative of strong gusts of dizziness. In 1993, Indonesia lost his neutrality after claims that China's road covering the Natuna Islands. In 1994, only days after one of the annual meeting, China did not hesitate to set a new milestone on the sovereignty Dalac reef. The relations of China - Philippines worsened again in 1995 following the discovery in February on the new military equipment on stone crab China Towel Ring.
Anyway consultation under the sponsorship of Indonesia can be implemented by a statement of intent on the occasion of Beijing Regional Forum of ASEAN security meeting in July 1995. For the first time, China said ready to negotiate with all countries in the choc. And, they have taken the basis of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea signed at Montego Bay in 1982 to discuss, but its parliament has not ratified the Convention again this (8).
Considering the above data, we find the arguments raised as a basis for other claims seem weak. Neither party may specify the presence of his regular - actually impossible - in the past on the island, as well as in fact they were controlled continuously. Not suitable for human life and no economic life, the islands and reefs that have no legal status to justify an exclusive economic zone or more to plan for the continental shelf. The continental shelf of Vietnam and Malaysia extend to the Spratlys would be able to have weight in the determination of maritime boundaries, rather than the many reefs of the archipelago.
The method will lead to a set of maritime boundaries without taking into account the reef, but by lifting the median line from the point on the shore of the coastal water. Under the assumption that China and Taiwan combined together, Vietnam and the Philippines will be the region has an area nearly equivalent. Paracel islands belonged to China - Taiwan in fact, however they will not be able to claim any rights to geological blocks located farther south, that is for oil and gas fields and major oil sector.
In no case is the agreement of the concerned countries, the proposed convention, for the half-closed sea, an agreement on the division of resources outside the exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles. Maybe China will give priority to choose this recipe because it fits their traditional stance, and allow them to penetrate the region where oil and gas while maintaining the ability to mobilize on the issue of sovereignty.
A formula for mutual development in the region will also satisfy the United States and Japan are concerned can not intervene to ensure the safety of the ship or the oil company of them.
Beijing more rigid
Will the division of oil have eliminated the risks of conflict do not? Food suspicious because the sovereignty issue is still there. Yet those in power in Beijing is ready, and always reminded, to use force to China's sovereignty be respected. The regional countries are concerned about China's intentions is because although the claim seems a bit vague, they did not give any signal can reassure everyone.
ASEAN countries recognize only the Chinese regime more rigid, increasing control in Tibet and all forms of dissent, firing missiles off the coast of Taiwan prior to the meeting of the ASEAN Forum, intransigence in the talks talks on the future of Hong Kong. They also see China increase the budget for modernizing the military with its consequences; test nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, weapons purchase from Russia (SU 24 aircraft - 27 in 1992 Recent submarines and 10) and manufacturing projects in China such weapons.
In addition, the region still has opinions about the installation of military equipment in the Andaman Sea, off the coast of India and Burma. These factors may explain the significant rights center for hegemony of one China's military power tends to increase. And the reason is: in fighting for the right to inherit Deng Xiaoping, once that 'it - President Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng and Vice Premier Zhou Ocean Engineering - are trying to get support of the military, who holds strong final legacy of the revolution. Instead of promoting discussions about the necessary reforms, the ongoing pain that held the throne for the conservative point of view even more weight the first goal is economic and resolutely towards the whole of internal and external, the tone National Republic ...
The increasing power of central government and the army was raised by the concern of the apparatus. The politicians and the military fear the collapse of the communist world and its value decreased legitimacy of the Party, the more expression of the opposition, increasing the independence of coastal provinces to rise specter of a divided China. They fear the new order arising from the Gulf War and its aftermath: the re-assertion of American hegemony and arrogant attitude of Washington politics (as the grant for Lee Teng Hui response Taiwan presidential election a U.S. entry visa in a separate trip), the preparation of a regional forum on security was the Chinese see as their control. etc.
Meanwhile, historically, fluctuations crystallize the delicate background of China's defense. Main from which the Western powers were to control the area in the nineteenth century. Also since then, the KMT got rid of the revolutionary forces. Finally, from then U.S. and Soviet Union establish regional control in the cold war. In short, The control of the south side of safety for the people's republic.
So, have focused all elements of a conflict. Context is raising aggressiveness of the central government. Military strength with the increase of political influence and the modernization of its equipment, facilities have to work above. Oil well as the return of Taiwan in the arms of Beijing is the big story was defeated. Extreme nationalism nurtured the climb, while the occupation of the island living space in the East Sea to create a dodong motivation. Law in 1992 and has ambitions to complete this work is presented as a plausible history: do not forget to press recall those glory days when Chinese people travel in the Spratly Islands, popular culture everywhere goods and advanced technologies of the Han people.
Maybe tomorrow there will be war? Anyway, assuming that nothing is certain. First, because of logistical limitations of the Chinese military. If clear water Corps forces, and submarine forces transported by helicopter which makes their occupation of the island not having too much difficulty, the distance between the Spratlys and the base of the rear China still requires air capability, but now they are not yet available. The training of pilots SU-27 does not guarantee dominance of China in the hoatd on the sea. Thus, the Navy vulnerable before the air force and missiles in Malaysia and Indonesia's geographical position better for the islands and is equipped with technology no more sophisticated goods.
The economy did not justify adventures. The development of China based on local trade and foreign investment, but it is not consistent with the conflict in the Spratlys. So why sacrifice for a temporary security and energy sources still uncertain, an economic process to ensure the maintenance of this regime of China and financial support for the modernization of the military? The ASEAN countries understand that contradiction. But they themselves know are not able to prevent China is motivated by the urgent action on domestic policy should launch a confrontation, but they also do not forget that the trio has invested, the dependence on trade and economic integration provide them the tools to prevent more persuasive.
For reasons of internal and external, Beijing must assert his power: Sea to allow them to do so. China can benefit from strategic space by the Americans and Russians to leave, as well as a correlation forces for their benefit. They easily manipulate the illusion of neighboring countries by coordinating secret military budget with no clear idea of the map. They may be wishful thinking to avenge the insult that the West forced them to bear before them out by type of negotiations.
They also conduct direct pressure on the Hong Kong and Taiwan, including by isolating these areas from the Asian solidarity may have. They found out the secret signal for both the coastal province south of them, reminded the province said that the central government is ready to control the entire territory, they were finally able to present no ambiguities everyone knows, their ambitions in the region, even across the world.
Certainly critical of Beijing's stance is that it. A smart way to use the Spratlys records may opened to them the resources sector strategy. Not create real risks, they hope to do so would confirm the picture of his great powers, in the meantime have the economic means and military to become a truly great powers. So do not be surprised that the problems associated with the oil and gas will find a solution for the medium term. But probably the issue of sovereignty has to hang there, making Beijing scallop has retained its diplomatic tiles.
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Posted Monde Diplomatique newspaper (France) on 03/20/1996
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